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Although one-time pad encrypted files can be sent through Internet channels, the need for re-
newing shared secret keys have made this method unpractical. This work presents a scheme to
turn practical the fast sharing of random keys over arbitrary Internet channels. Starting with a
shared secret key sequence of length K0 the users end up with a secure new sequence K ≫ K0.
Using these sequences for posteriori message encryption the legitimate users have absolute security
control without the need for third parties. Additionally, the security level does not depend on the
unproven difficulty of factoring numbers in primes. In the proposed scheme a fast optical random
source generates random bits and noise for key renewals. The transmitted signals are recorded sig-
nals that carries both the random binary signals to be exchanged and physical noise that cannot
be eliminated by the attacker. These signals allow amplification over the Internet network with-
out degrading security. The proposed system is also secure against a-posteriori known-plaintext
attack on the key. Information-theoretic analysis is presented and bounds for secure operation are
quantitatively determined.
PACS 89.70.+c,05.40.Ca,42.50.Ar,03.67.Dd
INTRODUCTION
Unconditionally secure one-time pad encryption [1] has
not find wide applicability in modern communications.
The difficult for users to share long streams of secret
keys beforehand has been an unsurmountable barrier pre-
venting widespread use of one-time pad systems. Even
beginning with a start sequence of shared secret keys,
no practical amplification method to obtain new key se-
quences or key “refreshing” is available. This work pro-
poses a solution for this problem where transmitted ran-
dom bit sequences are protected physical noise. Secure
operational bounds are imposed by the noise level used
and a controlled number of bits transmitted. Posterior
data encryption is done by X-or bit-by-bit the shared
random bits with the message bits as in one-time pad
encryption.
The method involves binary random sequences physi-
cally created (key sequence) X = x1, x2, ... to be trans-
mitted between the legitimate users A to B, and physical
noise sequences n = n1, n2, ... that are not controlled or
reducible by any means and will be physically superposed
onX. A and B share a starting secret keyK0. Also essen-
tial for the method is the use of physical non-orthogonal
bases specified by shared keys K to encode the message
bits X, before the deterministic “recording” of the noisy
signals described byY. The transmitted signals are open
to the attacker but improving signal resolution is impos-
sible over the deterministic patterns. This simplifies the
security considerations, distinctly from cases where the
attacker have access to physical signals in the channel and
may constantly improve its technology for signal resolu-
tion by performing homodyne, heterodyne and any other
measurement.
It will be assumed that (statistical) physical noise n
can be added to a message bit sequence X according to
some rule fj(xj , nj) giving Y = f1(x1, n1), f2(x2, n2), ...
(Whenever only binary physical signals are implied, use
of fj(xj , nj) will represent fj ≡ ⊕ (=addition mod2)).
When analog physical signals are made discrete by
analog-to-digital converters, a sum of a binary signal
onto a discrete set will be assumed or other convenient
rounding of the signal. fj describe operations on non-
orthogonal bases specified by shared keys K as will be
explained. The addition process is performed at the emit-
ter station and Y becomes a binary file carrying random
bits and the recorded noise. Y is sent from user A to
user B (or from B to A) through an insecure channel and
can be tapped with perfection (any copy will be identi-
cal to each other) by the attacker. The amount of noise
is assumed high and such that without any knowledge
beyond Y, neither B (or A) or an attacker E could ex-
tract the sequence X with a probability P better than
P ≃ (1/2)N , where N is the number of bits transmitted.
The conditional entropy for these randomized signals sat-
isfy
H(Y|K0,X) 6= 0 , (1)
that guarantees that even knowing the message X and
the key K0, the transmitted sequence Y is not unique.
This emphasizes the uncontrollable character of the phys-
ical noise present at each signal generation.
Assuming that A and B share some knowledge before-
hand (the key K0 or K), the amount of information be-
tween A (or B) and E differs. This information asymme-
try can be expressed by
HAB(X|Y,K)(≈ 0)≪ HE(X|Y)(≈ H(X)) . (2)
The mutual information reflects that E has much less
information on H(X) than A and B:
IAB(X;Y,K) = H(X)−HAB(X|Y,K) ≈ H(X),(3)
2IE(X;Y) = H(X)−HE(X|Y) ≈ 0 . (4)
This asymmetry will be used by A and B to share
secure information over the Internet. It will be shown
that if A and B start sharing a secret key sequence K0
they end up with a secure new key sequence K ≫ K0.
Within bounds to be demonstrated, this makes bit-by-bit
encryption (as a one-time pad) practical for fast Internet
communications (data, image or sound). It should be
emphasized that being secure does not imply that K0
can be open to the attacker after transmission. All keys,
K0 and K, have to be kept secret as long as messages
have to be protected, as in one-time pad communication.
The system gives users A and B direct control to guar-
antee secure communication without use of third parties
or certificates. Some may think of the method as an extra
protective layer to current Internet encryption protocols
and it may be used as such. In fact, the system oper-
ates on top of all IP layers and does not disturb current
protocols in use by Internet providers, including security
ones. Anyway, it should be emphasized that the proposed
method relies on security created by physical noise. This
way, its security level does not depend on advances in
algorithms or computation. Also, the proposed proto-
col does not need to be modified to follow improvements
in communication’s technology. Moreover, it works as a
stand-alone system.
Random events of physical origin cannot be determin-
istically predicted and sometimes are classified in classi-
cal or quantum events (See examples of differences be-
tween quantum and classical random walks in [2]). The
point of view adopted here is that a recorded classical
random event is just the record of a single realization
among all the possible quantum trajectories possible [3].
All of these distinct classifications are not relevant to the
practical aspects to be discussed here. However, what
should be emphasized is that physical noise is completely
different from pseudo noise generated in a determinis-
tic process (e.g. hardware stream ciphers) where despite
any complexity introduced, the deterministic generation
mechanism can be searched, eventually discovered and
used by the attacker.
SIGNAL ENCODING
Before introducing the communication protocol to be
used, one should discuss the superposition of physical sig-
nals to deterministic binary signals. Any signal transmit-
ted over Internet is physically prepared to be compatible
with the channel being used. This way, e.g., voltage lev-
els V0 and V1 in a computer may represent bits. These
values may be understood as the simple encoding
V (0) ⇒
{
V0 → bit 0
V1 → bit 1 (5)
Technical noise, e.g. electrical noise, in bit levels V0
and V1 are assumed low. Also, channel noise are as-
sumed with a modest level. Errors caused by these noises
are assumed to be possibly corrected by classical error-
correction codes. Anyway, the end user is supposed to
receive the bit sequence X (prepared by a sequence of V0
and V1) as determined by the sender.
If one of these deterministic binary signals xj is re-
peated over the channel, e.g. x1 = x and x2 = x,
one has the known property x1 ⊕ x2 = 0. This prop-
erty has to be compared to cases where a non-negligible
amount of physical noise nj (in analog or a discrete
form) has been added to each emission. Writing y1 =
f1(x1, n1) = f1(x, n1) and y2 = f2(x2, n2) = f2(x, n2)
one has f(y1, y2) = neither 0 or 1 in general. This funda-
mental difference from the former case where x1⊕x2 = 0
emphasizes the uncontrollable effect of the noise.
The V (0) encoding shown above allows binary values
V0 and V1 to represent bits 0 and 1, respectively. These
values are assumed to be determined without ambiguity.
Instead of this unique encoding consider that two distinct
encodings can be used to represent bits 0 and 1: Either
V (0) over which x
(0)
0 and x
(0)
1 represent the two bits 0
and 1 respectively, or V (1), over which x
(1)
1 = x
(0)
0 +ǫ and
x
(1)
0 = x
(0)
1 + ǫ (ǫ ≪ 1) represent the two bits 1 or 0 (in
a different order from the former assignment). These en-
codings represent physical signals as, for example, phase
signals.
Assume noiseless transmission signals but where noise
nj has been introduced or added to each j
th bit sent
(This is equivalent to noiseless signals in a noisy channel).
Consider that the user does not know which encoding
V (0) or V (1) was used. With a noise level nj superposed
to signals in V (0) or V (1) and if |x(0)0 − x(1)0 | ≫ nj ≫ ǫ,
one cannot distinguish between signals 0 and 1 in V (0)
and V (1) = V (0) + ǫ but one knows easily that a signal
belongs either to the set “0 in V (0) or 1 in V (1)” or to
the set “1 in V (0) or 0 in V (1)”. Also note that once the
encoding used is known, there is no difficulty to identify
between xj and xj+ǫ. In this case, it is straightforward to
determine a bit 0 or 1 because values in a single encoding
are widely separated and, therefore, distinguishable. One
may say that without information on the encoding used,
the bit values cannot be determined.
Physical noise processes will be detailed ahead but this
indistinguishability of the signals without basis informa-
tion is the clue for A and B to share random bits over
the Internet in a secure way.
Encryption methods with randomized ciphers have
been proven to be secure, e.g., when the attacker’s mem-
ory is limited [4]. More recently, physical noise has been
used both in free propagation and fiber-optics based sys-
tems using M -ry levels [5] for data encryption (αη sys-
tems) and have been analyzed ever since. See a recent
3from those αη systems but the idea of covering informa-
tion with physical noise underlies both logical structures.
The proposed system is closer related to to the key distri-
bution system presented in [7] but differs from it by the
use of a deterministic channel to carry noisy-recorded in-
formation (Some other aspects have been shown in [8]
and [9]) and the use of just two encryption bases [10].
Use of the (ideally) deterministic channel –or high in-
tensity channels– makes this system slower than the αη
systems [5] or [7] due to the recording stage but avoids
amplification problems related to those systems.
DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL
A brief description of protocol steps will be made, be-
fore a theoretic-security analysis that includes the sys-
tem’s limitations is presented. Assume that shared se-
quence K0 gives encoding information, that is to say,
which encoding (V (0) or V (1)) is being used at the jth
emission. Assume that K0 = k
(0)
1 , k
(0)
2 , ... has length K0
and that the user A has a physical random generator
PhRG able to generate random bits and noise in contin-
uous levels. A generates a binary random sequence K1 =
k
(1)
1 , k
(1)
2 , ...k
(1)
K0
(say, binary voltage levels) and a se-
quence ofK0 noisy-signals n (e.g., voltage levels in a con-
tinuum). The deterministic sequence (carrying recorded
noise) Y1 = k
(0)
1 ⊕ f1(k(1)1 , n(1)1 ), k(0)2 ⊕ f2(k(1)2 , n(1)2 ), ... is
then sent to B. First, one has to see if B is able to extract
the fresh sequence K1 from Y1: B applies f (Y1,K0) ≡
f1(k
(1)
1 , n
(1)
1 ), f2(k
(1)
2 , n
(1)
2 ), ...fN (k
(1)
N , n
(1)
N ). As B knows
the encoding used and the signals representing bits
0 or 1 in a given encoding are easily identifiable.
B obtains f1(k
(1)
1 , n
(1)
1 ) → k(1)1 , f2(k(1)2 , n(1)2 ) →
k
(1)
2 , ...fN (k
(1)
N , n
(1)
N )→ k(1)N . B then obtains the new ran-
dom sequence K1 generated by A.
Is the attacker also able to extract the same sequence
K1? Actually, this was a one-time pad with K0 with
added noise and, therefore, it is known that the attacker
cannot obtainK1. The security problem arises for further
exchanges of random bits, e.g. if B wants to share further
secret bits with A.
Assume that B also has a physical random generator
PhRG able to generate random bits and noise in con-
tinuous levels (One could proceed with A being the sole
one generating random signals but the problem is identi-
cal). B wants to send in a secure way a freshly generated
key sequence K2 = k
(2)
1 , k
(2)
1 , ...k
(2)
K0
from his PhRG to
A. B record the signals Y2 = k
(1)
1 ⊕ f1(k(2)1 , n(2)2 ), k(1)2 ⊕
f2(k
(2)
2 , n
(2)
2 ), ... and sends it to A. As A knows K1 he(or
she) applies Y2 ⊕ K1 and extracts K2. A and B now
share the two new sequences K1 and K2. For speeding
communication, even a simple rounding process to the
nearest encoding position would produce a simple binary
output for the operation fj(kj , nj). The security of this
process will be shown after a presentation of the complete
distribution protocol.
The simple description presented show a key distribu-
tion from A to B and from B to A, with the net re-
sult that A and B share the fresh sequences K1 and K2.
These steps can be seen as a first distribution cycle. A
could again send another fresh sequence K3 to B and so
on. This repeated procedure provides A and B with se-
quences K1,K2,K3,K4, .... This is the basic and simple
key distribution protocol for the system.
A caveat should be made. Although the key sharing
seems adequate to go without bounds, physical proper-
ties impose some constraints and length limitations as
discussed ahead.
PHYSICAL ENCODING
A and B use PhRGs to generate physical signals creat-
ing the random bits that define the key sequences K and
the continuous noise n necessary for the protocol. Being
physical signals, precise variables have to discussed and
the noise source well characterized. Analog-to-digital in-
terfaces will transform the physical signals onto binary
sequences adequate for Internet transmission protocols.
Optical sources for the noise signals can be chosen for
fast speeds. PhRGs have been discussed in the literature
and even commercial ones are now starting to be avail-
able. Increasing operational speeds are expected. With-
out going into details one could divide the PhRG in two
parts, one generating random binary signals and another
providing noise in a continuous physical variable (e.g.,
phase of a light field). These two signals are detected,
adequately formatted and can be added.
Taking the phase of a light field as the physical vari-
able of interest, one could assume laser light in a coherent
state with average number of photons 〈n〉 within one co-
herence time (〈n〉 = |α|2 ≫ 1) and phase φ. Phases φ = 0
could define the bit 0 while φ = π could define the bit 1.
A concrete image of a possible phase encoding with
non-orthogonal states is seen in Fig. 1. k = 0 defines
encoding of 0 and 1 as phase values 0 and π, respec-
tively. These values are widely separated and easily dis-
tinguishable. This ease distinguishability will be quanti-
fied ahead. Distinctly, k = 1 defines encoding of 0 and
1 with phase values π + ∆φ and 0 + ∆φ, respectively.
These bits are also easily distinguishable in k = 1. How-
ever, the poor distinguishability between 0s and 1s in
distinct bases k = 0 and k = 1 is crucial for the proposed
scheme; this will be quantitatively explained. A bit 0 on
this sector is encoded by one of the phases
φ0k =
[
k∆φ+ π
1− (−1)k
2
]
, (k = 0, 1) , (6)
4φ∆
2 2 2 / nφσ = ¢ ²
0k = 1k =
10
10
FIG. 1: Bit positions in a phase sector with two possible en-
codings (physical bases) defined by k = 0 and k = 1. Dark
circles indicate positions for a bit 0 and open circles give po-
sitions for a bit 1 on each encoding k. ∆φ is the spacing
between the two bases. σφ is the standard phase deviation
caused by phase fluctuations in a coherent light field. 〈n〉 is
adjusted so that σφ covers close phase values. ∆φ should be
kept ≪ pi/2.
while a bit 1 is encoded by
φ1k = π +
[
k∆φ+ π
1− (−1)k
2
]
, (k = 0, 1) , (7)
It can be shown [7] (also shown ahead) that two
non-orthogonal states with phases φ1 and φ2 (∆φ12 =
|φ1−φ2| → 0 and 〈n〉 ≫ 1) overlap with (un-normalized)
probability
pu ≃ e−(∆φ12)
2/2σ2φ , (8)
where σφ =
√
2/〈n〉 is the standard deviation measure
for the phase fluctuations ∆φ. For distinguishable states,
pu → 0 (no overlap) and for maximum indistinguishabil-
ity pu = 1 (complete overlap). With adequate formatting
φ1−φ2 gives the spacing ǫ (∆φ12 = ǫ) already introduced.
Eq. (8) with ∆φ12 replaced by ∆φ describes the prob-
ability for generic phase fluctuations ∆φ in a coherent
state of constant amplitude |α| =
√
〈n〉.
The laser light intensity is adjusted by A (or B) such
that σφ ≫ ∆φ. This guarantees that the recorded infor-
mation in the files to be sent over the open channel is
in a condition such that the recorded light noise makes
the two close levels φ1 and φ2 highly indistinguishable
to the attacker. In order to avoid the legitimate user to
confuse 0s and 1s in a single encoding, the light fluctu-
ation should obey σφ ≪ π/2. These conditions can be
summarized as
π
2
≫
√
2/〈n〉 ≫ ∆φ . (9)
This shows that this key distribution system depends fun-
damentally on physical aspects for security and not just
on mathematical complexity.
The separation between bits in the same encoding is
easily carried under condition π/2≫
√
2/〈n〉. The con-
dition
√
2/〈n〉 ≫ ∆φ implies that bits 0 (in encoding
k = 0) and 1 (in encoding k = 1) (upper position in
Fig. 1) cannot be easily identifiable and the same hap-
pens with sets of bit 1 (in encoding k = 0) and bit 0 (in
encoding k = 1) (lower position in Fig. 1). However, for
A, B and E, there are no difficulty to identify that a sent
signal is encoded by k = 0 or k = 1. One may there-
fore assume that physical signals within the same encod-
ing k have negligible overlap. The signal distinguishabil-
ity could also be studied assuming non-negligible overlap
between “upper” and “lower” states but results [9] are
similar under the desired conditions.
Signal distinguishability
The attacker does not know the encoding provided to
A or B by their shared knowledge on the basis used. An
answer to the question “What is the attacker’s proba-
bility of error in bit identification without repeating a
sent signal?” depends on the properties of the physical
signals being used. Under the assumption that “upper”
positions and “lower” positions in Fig. 1 can be iden-
tified with high precision both by the legitimate users
as well as by the attacker, this question basically deals
with distinguishability of the two close physical states in
“upper”or “down” positions.
Binary identification of two states has a general answer
using information theory: The average probability of er-
ror in identifying two states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 is given by the
Helstrom bound [12]
Pe =
1
2
[
1−
√
1− |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2
]
. (10)
Here |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are coherent states of light |ψ〉 [13]
with same amplitude but distinct phases
|ψ〉 = |α〉 = ||α|e−iφ〉 = e− 12 |α|2
∑
n
αn√
n!
|n〉 , (11)
defined at the PhRG. |ψ0〉 define states in encoding k = 0,
where bits 0 and 1 are given by
|ψ0〉 =
{ |α〉, for bit 0, and
| − α〉, for bit 1 , (12)
|ψ1〉 define states in encoding k = 1, where bits 1 and 0
are given by
|ψ1〉 =
{
||α|e−i∆φ2 〉, for bit 1, and
||α|e−i(∆φ2 +pi)〉, for bit 0 , (13)
where |φk=0 − φk=1| = ∆φ. |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2 is calculated in a
straightforward way and gives
|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2 = e−2〈n〉[1−cos
∆φ
2 ] . (14)
5For 〈n〉 ≫ 1 and ∆φ≪ 1,
|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2 ≃ e−
〈n〉
4
∆φ2 ≡ e−∆φ2/(2σ2φ) . (15)
One should remind that in the proposed system the
measuring procedure is defined by the users A and B and
no physical attack can be launched by E can improve
the deterministic signals that were already available to
him(her). Thus, her knowledge on the signals cannot be
increased by measurement techniques.
INFORMATION LEAK AND LENGTH
LIMITATION
One should observe that each random bit defining the
key sequence is once sent as a message by A (or B) and
then resent as a key (encoding information) from B (or
A) to A (or B). In a deterministic encryption this will
lead straightforwardly to a breaking of the security. The
noisy signals modify this situation dramatically: In both
emissions, noise is superposed to the signals. In gen-
eral, repetitions of coherent signal imply that a better
resolution may be achieved that is proportional to the
number of repetitions r. This improvement in resolu-
tion is equivalent to a single measurement with a signal
r × more intense. To take into account the single repeti-
tion demanded by the protocol 〈n〉 is replaced by 2〈n〉 in
|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2. In other words, the protection level will then
be considered for signal levels twice stronger than the one
currently used. The final probability of error results
Pe =
1
2
[
1−
√
1− e− 〈n〉2 ∆φ2
]
. (16)
This error probability can be used to derive some of the
proposed system’s limitations. The attacker’s probability
of success Ps (= 1 − Pe) to obtain the basis used in a
single emission may be used to compare with the a-priori
starting entropy Hk of the encoding that carries one bit
of the message to be sent (a random bit). If the attacker
knows the encoding, the bit will also be known, with the
same probability → 1 as the legitimate user.
Hk,bit = −p0 log p0 − p1 log p1 = 1 , (17)
where p0 and p1 are the a-priori probabilities for each
encoding k (p0 = p1 = 1/2) given by the PhRG. The
entropy defined by success events is Hs = −Ps logPs.
The entropy variation ∆H = Hk,bit − Hs statistically
obtained –or leaked from bit measurements– show the
statistical information acquired by the attacker with re-
spect to the a-priori starting entropy:
∆Hk =
(
Hk,bit −Hs
)
. (18)
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FIG. 2: ∆Hk as a function of 〈n〉 and ∆φ.
Fig. 2 shows ∆Hk for some values of 〈n〉 and ∆φ.
Value ∆Hk = 1/2 is the limiting case where the two
bases cannot be distinguished. ∆Hk deviations from this
limiting value of 1/2 indicates that some amount of in-
formation on the basis used may potentially be leaking
to the attacker. However, it is clear that the attacker
cannot obtain bit-by-bit the encoding used.
Length limitation
In order to be possible to obtain statistically a good
amount of information on a single encoding used, L bits
have to be transmitted. L thus establishes the length
limitation for bits exchanged starting from K0. It will
be defined by
L×
(
∆Hk − 1
2
)
= 1 . (19)
Fig. 3 shows estimates for L for a range of values 〈n〉 and
∆φ satisfying L× (∆Hk − 12) = 1 (∆φ is given in powers
of 2, indicating bit resolution for analog-to-digital con-
verters). It should be emphasized that 〈n〉 is the meso-
scopic average photon number in the PhRG while an op-
tical signal in the transmission channel can be carried by
very intense light–the deterministic signal.
It is assumed that error correction codes can correct for
technical errors in the transmission/reception steps for
the legitimate users. The leak estimate given by Eq. (19)
do not imply that the information actually has leaked to
the attacker. However, for security reasons, one takes for
granted that this deviation indicate a statistical fraction
of bits acquired by the attacker. A probability measure
corresponds to condition (19): p(1) = 1/L =
(
∆Hk − 12
)
,
expressing that one bit among L bits may have been sta-
tistically compromised.
Privacy amplification procedures can be applied to the
shared bits in order to reduce this hypothetical infor-
mation gained by the attacker to negligible levels [11].
65
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
25
5000
10000
15000
20000
L
15
1
2
13
1
2
n¢ ²
100
600
350
φ∆
FIG. 3: Estimates for the minimum length of bits L ex-
changed between A and B that could give one bit of infor-
mation about the bases used to the attacker.
These procedures are beyond the purposes of the present
discussion but one can easily accept that A and B may
discard a similar fraction of bits to statistically reduce the
amount of information potentially leaked. Reducing this
fraction of bits after a succession of bits are exchanged
between A and B implies, e.g., that the number of bits to
be exchanged will decrease at every emission. Eventually,
a new shared key K0 has to start the process again to
make the system secure. Nevertheless, the starting key
length K0 was boosted in a secure way. Without further
procedures, the physical noise allowed K ≫ 103K0, a
substantial improvement over the classical one-time pad
factor of 1. One may still argue that the ultimate se-
curity relies on K0’s because if K0 is known no secret
will exist for the attacker. This is also true but does not
invalidate the practical aspect of the system. K0 length
can even be made sufficiently long to frustrate any brute-
force attack at any stage of technology. Therefore, the
combination of physical noise and complexity makes this
noisy-one-time pad practical for Internet uses.
FRUSTRATING A-POSTERIORI
KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACKS
Known-plaintext attack
Although the security of the process has been demon-
strated, one should also point to a fragility of the system
that has to be avoided when A and B are encrypting
messages X between them. As it was shown, knowledge
of one sequence of random bits lead to the knowledge
of the following sequence for A and B. This makes the
system vulnerable to know-plaintext attacks in the fol-
lowing way: E has a perfect record of sequences Y1 and
Y2 and tries to recover any key sequence from them,
K2, K1 or K0. E will wait until A and B uses these
sequences for encryption before trying to brake the sys-
tem. A and B will encrypt a message using a new shared
sequence, K1 or K2. This message could be a plaintext,
say X = x1, x2, ...xK0 known to the attacker. Encrypt-
ing this message with say K1 in a noiseless way, gives
Y = x1 ⊕ k(1)1 , x2 ⊕ k(1)2 , ...xK0 ⊕ k(1)K0 . Performing the
operation Y ⊕X, E obtains K1. The chain dependence
of Kj on Kj−1 allows E to find successive keys. Even
addition of noise to the encrypted file does not eliminate
this fragility, because the attacker can use his/her knowl-
edge of X –as the key– to obtain K–as a message. The
situation is symmetric between B or the attacker: one
that knows the key (X for E, and K for B) obtains the
desired message (K for E, and X for B).
This kind of attack can be frustrated to the attacker
with a simple strategy as explained ahead. In general,
random generation processes are attractive to attackers.
Even physical components (e.g. PhRG) are targets for
attackers that may try to substitute a true random se-
quence by pseudo-random bits generated by a seed key
under his/her control. Electronic components can also
be inserted to perform this task replacing the original
generator; electric or electromagnetic signal may induce
sequences for the attacker and so on. While these can be
controlled by simple equipment surveillance, the known-
plaintext attack is more subtle. A may not know, e.g.,
that some information to be transmitted to B is known
to the attacker.
Frustrating the known-plaintext attack
This attack can be avoided by shuffling (permutation
operations) the random bit sequence being transmitted
from A to B (or B to A) followed by a re-shuffling by B
(or A). A particular shuffling function could be chosen
among members of a family of one-way functions by use
of a short sequence of shared secret random bits. An even
simpler way (or less costly) is to use the short sequence
of bits to choose one among a list of pre-recorded permu-
tations, what speeds the processing time. The shuffling
function used changes from block to block of sequences
exchanged. This creates a non-invertible structure for
the attacker.
Although the number of bits ns necessary to select one
amongK0! permutations inK0 bits has a too high cost, a
reduced number of permutationsK0!/d withinK0! can be
chosen to provide the pre-recorded list and still provide
a negligible chance for the attacker to obtain a particular
choice among K0!/d. With this reduced list, the number
of bits nb necessary to assign a particular permutation is
given by K0!/d = 2
nb . At the same time the probability
pd for the attacker to find this particular permutation
choice is pd = 1/(K0!/d).
The a-posteriori known-plaintext attack can then be
frustrated by the shuffled sequence. The random bit se-
7quence used in this process is also protected by the en-
cryption method with the added noise.
MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
Encryption performed by one user with the shared
random bits can only be decrypted by the other legit-
imate user and the message obtained can therefore be
understood as “authentic”. However, it may happen that
particular messages need explicit message authentication
without the need to decrypt. Fortunately, this can be
done with a modest use of shared secret random bits.
For example, Ref. [14] describes a message authentica-
tion code (MAC) where one key with k shared secret
bits encode message blocks and generate a tag T . No
decryption is needed, the receiver applies the shared key
to the received data stream to generate the tag T ′. Au-
thenticity is given by T ′ = T .
CONCLUSIONS
As a conclusion, it has been shown that Internet users
will succeed in generating and sharing, in a fast way,
a large number of secret keys to be used in bit-by-bit
encryption (one-time pad). They have to start from a
shared secret sequence of random bits obtained from a
physical random generator. The physical noise in the
signals openly transmitted is set to hide the random
bits sent. No intrusion detection method is necessary.
Privacy amplification protocols eliminate any fraction of
information that may have eventually obtained by the
attacker. As the security is not only based on mathemat-
ical complexities but depend on physical noise, scientific
or technological advances will not harm this system.
This is then very different from systems that would rely
entirely, say, on the current lack of efficient algorithms
to factor large numbers into their primes. The system is
also secure against a posteriori known-plaintext attacks
on the key. It was then shown that by sharing secure
secret key sequences, a practical bit-by-bit encryption
over the Internet can be implemented.
∗E-mail: GeraldoABarbosa@hotmail.com
[1] G. S. Vernam, J. Amer. Inst. Elec. Eng. 55, 109 (1926).
C. E. Shannon, Bell Syst. Tech. J. 28, 656 (1949).
[2] A. M. Childs, E. Farhi, and S. Gutmann, Quantum In-
formation Processing 1, 35 (2002).
[3] V. P. Belavkin, Int. J. of Theoretical Physics 42, 461
(2003).
[4] U. M. Maurer, Advances in Cryptography-
EUROCRYPT90 (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1991) p.
361.
[5] G. A. Barbosa, E. Corndorf, P. Kumar, and H. P. Yuen,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 227901 (2003). E. Corndorf, G. A.
Barbosa, C. Liang, H. P. Yuen, and P. Kumar, Opt. Lett.
28, 2040 (2003). G. A. Barbosa, E. Corndorf, and P.
Kumar, Quantum Electronics and Laser Science Confer-
ence, OSA Technical Digest 74, 189 (2002). H. P. Yuen,
arXiv:quant-ph/0311061 V6, xxx.lanl.gov, 2003.
[6] O. Hirota and K. Kurosawa, Quantum Information Pro-
cessing 6, 81 (2006).
[7] G. A. Barbosa, Phys. Rev. A 68, 052307 (2003); Phys.
Review A 71, 062333 (2005); quant-ph/0607093 v2 16
Aug 2006.
[8] G.A. Barbosa, arXiv:quant-ph/0607093 v2 16 Aug 2006.
[9] G.A. Barbosa, arXiv:quant-ph/0704.1484 v1 11 Apr
2007.
[10] C H. Bennett and S. J. Wiesner, Quantum key distribu-
tion using non-orthogonal macroscopic signals, USPTO
patent 5,515,438 (1996), Assignee: International Busi-
ness Machines Corporation.
[11] S. Wolf, Information-Theoretically and Computationally
Secure Key Agreement in Cryptography, PhD thesis,
ETH Zurich 1999.
[12] C. W. Helstrom, Quantum Detection and Estimation
Theory, ed. R. Bellman (Academic Press, 1976), pg. 113
Eq. (2.34).
[13] R. J. Glauber, Phys. Rev. 130, 2529 (1963); Phys. Rev.
131, 2766 (1963); Quantum Optics and Electronics, eds.
C. DeWitt, A. Blandin, C. Cohen-Tannoudji (Dunod,
Paris 1964), Proc. E´cole d’E´te´ de Physique The´orique de
Les Houches, 1964.
[14] FIPS PUB 198 (2002) (Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication), The Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC),
and Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ.
800-38B (May 2005) CODEN: NSPUE2, in
“http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html#sp800-38B”
describes “OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC ”, by T. Iwata
and K. Kurosawa.
